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LAW AND THE
DEMOCRATIC ,STATE*
RT. HON. LORD RADCLIFFE,

W

G.B.E.t

E HAVE BEEN ACCUSTOMED to thinking of Law as an institution

which justifies itself by its evident connection with what is
wise, what is equitable, what is fair - in short, with all that range of
epithet that seems to make it consonant with the dignity of a decent
man that he should be ready to obey the Law and to adjust his conduct according to its requirements. And this readiness is looked for
from him, even to his own detriment, even without the eye of authority
or of his neighbours upon him. It is that belief that has made Law, with
all its imperfections, a potent bond of society. With all its imperfections,
it has been thought to represen certain principles of conduct, of human
relationship, which have a permanent validity and which do not admit
of alteration or reversal by any process of law-making or "law-giving,"
as it is quaintly called. If one could not hold that belief, it would be
impossible, for instance, to regard the study of Law as a study of one of
the great Humanities - a feat of memory, an amusing intellectual exercise, a study of social phenomena: all that, if you please, as well as useful
vocational training - but not an initiation into one of the great Humanities, as our ancestors thought it to be. The Elizabethans, as you know,
regarded a young man's admission to an Inn of Court in London as
equivalent to the undertaking of a University education. The comparison
is misleading, unless one allows for the limits of University education in
the sixteenth century and remembers that an Inn of Court could serve
* Reprinted, with permission, from 52 THE BRIEF (Fall 1956) published by The
International Legal Fraternity of Phi Delta Phi; originally delivered as an address
before the Holdsworth Club of the Faculty of Law of the University of Birmingham.
t Lord Radcliffe, G. B. E., has been a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary since 1949. He
was called to the Bar, Inner Temple in 1924; became a Bencher in 1943. He has
held appointments as Director General, Ministry of Information; Vice Chairman,
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as a school of manners as well as a school
in the stricter sense; but at least it serves
to show that modern English society has at
its base the idea that a study of Law is
worthy to serve as an introduction to civilised life.
I spoke first of the study of Law, since I
am speaking to members of the Faculty of
Law in the University of Birmingham. But
Law must justify itself, too, and justify
itself afresh to each new generation, as the
bond of a society of free men. Unless they
can accept it willingly and see it - not in
every detail, but in general aspects - as
informed by a spirit that is worthy of their
respect, that carries indeed some sense of
a majesty entitled to their reverence, the
bond of society is most disastrously loosened. It is very hard to see any relation
between the petty and often dreary details
that make up Law in practice and any elevated conception of duty to which men's
hearts can respond. But it is not novel to
sigh: "To discern the law of God and the
law of reason from the law positive is very
hard." In many cases it can only be a question of Yes or No, not a question of right
or wrong. Yet it is the vital task of anyone
who deals with Law, judge or legislator,
to relate these very details to some system
of ideas that is of greater value than themselves.
I do not think that contemporary society
is sufficiently alive to the danger of putting
Law upon the assembly line. Respect for
Law for its own sake is a slow growth. It
does not come naturally. It has arisen out
of many centuries of customs and beliefs
and ideas which have gradually deposited
the legal frame as something upon which
the flesh of society can fittingly hang itself.
The vice of our modern democratic societies is that they trade upon the long estab-

lished reputation of Law while they often
market what are but'shoddy good§.
Another Name for Statute Law
Than "Law" Itself?
This is not a subject which is helped by
metaphors. The point can be put in a question: have we not come to a time when we
must find another name for statute law than
Law itself? Para-law, perhaps, or even
sub-law? Of course I am forcing the issue,
since many of the great landmarks of our
social history have been placed by statute
law and could have been placed by no other
means. But I am exaggerating deliberately,
in order to suggest to you two matters for
your consideration. One is that we may
need to review the usual line of division
which puts on one side orders and regulations and, if you please, by-laws, and on the
other Acts of Parliament and "judges' law."
The former are commonly felt to be entitled
to a lower status of authority despite the
fact that both have to be obeyed. The
formal ground of distinction is that the
maker of orders and regulations enjoys a
delegated authority within a prescribed
field, whereas the legislative body itself
possesses independent authority and there
are no limits to its field. Incidentally, in
countries which enjoy the bracing restraints
of a written constitution this contrast loses
its force. It is interesting to speculate
whether democracies organised on this pattern are not likely to preserve a more vivid
sense of the status and authority of Law
than countries such as our own in which
the principles of Rousseau seem at last to
have found a home. But, however that may
be, I want to stress the very great difference in psychological impact between law
which is currently made before your eyes
by people whom you know, as it were -
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orders in other words - and Law which is
declared, and interpreted as something established in the very bones of your society.
For the present purpose the comparative
excellence of the two sources of law is
irrelevant. It is the respective methods of
creation that matters. Indeed we may assume as given that the intended purpose of
statute law is to correct or supplement the
Common Law when it is inadequate or has
gone astray.
The Effect of Whiggism
And the second matter for consideration
is this. So far as this country goes, it is only
within, say, the last three generations that
it would not have seemed absurdly provocative to dwell upon the kind of theme
that I am illustrating. The Whig theory of
the relationship of Parliament to the general civil law of the land established itself
so firmly in men's minds that it held its
place some long while after the Whigs
themselves had ceased to be a dominant
force in political life - unless you think that
Whiggism must always be a force in political life, but that it appears from time to
time under other titles and with a different
vocabulary. What do I mean by Whiggism?
Probably not what a historian means. I
mean a general way of thinking which,
accepting the obvious necessity that there
should be a supreme authority to make
new laws for society from time to time
and that the authority should be kept reasonably representative, holds that there
should be a strong preference for a society
in which each man is left so far as possible
"to work out his own salvation." I have
borrowed the last phrase, I suppose, from
Methodism. It is historically incorrect. But
I think that our own times may have to
face the question whether such a phrase
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does not more truly express what best there
is in the Whig theory than the principles
with which it was more currently associated, that trade will not prosper under
Government regulation, that power corrupts, that the institution of property is the
foundation of civil society, etc. It is enough
for the moment to point out that, so long
as any recognisable theory persisted that
gave common law and statute law a working relation with each other, there was
nothing incongruous in using the one word
Law to comprehend the corpus that consisted of the two. Each existed to supplement the other. Indeed, if you took a very
ancient branch of the Law, such as the law
of real property, a lawyer might well have
to pause and think twice before he remembered whether some particular rule was
laid down by Act of Parliament or was a
native growth of the common law. The
history of judicial interpretation of statutes
serviceably illustrates the point. Even as
late as the eighteenth century it was still
possible to question whether there were not
some rules of the common law which no
Act of Parliament could overrule. This
speculation may seem vain, to us, but it
would not have surprised a mediaeval
lawyer. Putting it aside, the Law Courts
followed two main lines of approach. One
was to give a decidedly cool reception to
any statutory provision which appeared to
interfere with existing rights or to impose
new liabilities - the so-called "strict"
method of construction. The other was
to rationalise freely for the sake of "harmonising" the provisions of a statute; a
process which not infrequently resulted in
an Act of Parliament being made to say,
not so much what its makers had intended
it to say, as what the judges of the day
thought that a properly conceived Act
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ought to have said. Both methods of inter-

pretation may have been carried too far,
though they did good as well as harm: but
at least they were an honest recognition of
the fact that statute law and common law
ought each to be regarded as sharing the
same nature with the other. It is only in
quite recent times that the vitality of the
judicial contribution to statute law seems
to have declined into a patient exposition
of the apparent. One can hardly be surprised, considering the density of the jungle
which one is asked to treat as a wood. I
noted that last year the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council was still able to quote:
It is in the last degree improbable that the
legislature would overthrow fundamental
principles "infringe rights" or depart from
the general system of law without expressing
its intention with irresistible clearness.'
I am glad that this principle can still be
treated as a reality in the application of
statutes within the Imperial system, but it
is, all the same, a large claim on the part
of the courts tb require a sovereign legislature to state explicitly what it may not even
be concerned to understand.
Have we not then come near to a time
when Law means little more to anyone
than the vast and complicated mass of
things that he is compelled to do or not to
do by virtue of some Act of Parliament or
some order or regulation which an Act of
Parliament has wished upon him? And, if
so, can we expect people to care greatly
what the Law does or does not require of
them, except so far as for practical reasons
they have to find out, to their peril or to
their advantage? And can we expect people
to give any willing adherence to such a
system of law, except again for purely prac1 MAXWELL,

INTERPRETATION

(10th ed. 1875).
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tical reasons: which, in this case, means in
order to keep out of trouble? I wish that
our leaders would think more attentively
about these things before they categorise
our democratic civilisations so easily as
"the Free World." I know that it is held to
make a vital difference that our system is
imposed upon us by a representative lawmaking body which is liable to be changed
from time to time by the process of popular
election. But we may find we have comforted ourselves too long with the enormous
simplifications that are involved in this
defence. When the control of the law-making body must be entirely in the hands of
one of two political parties, each of which,
for the sake of survival, is forced to require
an orthodoxy of political conduct and opinion from all its members; and when, in
order to be elected at all, each party must
devise for the electorate a programme of
action calculated to appeal to the material
interests of the greater number; it becomes
increasingly unlikely that any general belief
will survive to teach us that the system of
law by which we are governed bears a recognisable relation to those ideas of equity
and wisdom which most men would wish
to see imprinted on the fabric of society.
This gloomy conclusion does not bear upon
the policies of any one party. It is a criticism of a social theory to which the system
itself subscribes.
A Lost Clue
Something has gone wrong. Some clue
has been lost. I do not say that because
I quarrel with the content of our laws today
or doubt that they represent a great. improvement on the past. But what does seem
to me to have become pretty plain is that
the popular democracies cannot go on for
long in the way that they have been doing,
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in which legislation is not only regarded as
being an expression of the popular will but
is regarded as needing no other justification
than that it is such an expression, and at
the same time retain a system of law which
enjoys the prestige and the intellectual content of what stood for Law in the older
forms of their society. We can put it this
way: they will need their police forces and
their magistrates, but they can hardly find
much place for judges.
I speak as if that were necessarily a sign
of. deterioration. Perhaps, however, I am
influenced by professional feeling which
leads me to interoret as decay what is nothing but a natural change. Indeed, I think
that a lot of people would disagree with my
diagnosis and would say that it is inherently
a better state of things when the Law can
constantly be moulded and remoulded at
short notice to accord with contemporary
social needs and social feeling. I think that
I should myself agree with much of that if
I understood what it meant or where it was
to take us. In the end I believe that it comes
down to the old philosophical question
which has divided Europe in modern times:
is Law to be thought of as an expression
of the general will of society, the better law
the more flexibly it changes in response to
that changing will; or may we, however
imperfectly, try to relate it to some other,
more constant, less mundane, authority?
Many modern societies have gone very far
in pursuit of the first alternative, often for
the best motives and often in such a way
as to produce the most benevolent results.
And often, fortunately for human nature,
either alternative has recommended the
same practical course of action. But it is
just that mundane view of Law which has
effectively weakened the growth that we
ought to have seen of the authority of
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International Law. For it is in the nature
of things that that Law can only bind those
who will allow it an' origin that shares something of the divine. And, pace Rousseau,
expressions of the general will of a single
organised society make a deity so homely
that there are few will do it reverence.
Lawyers at any rate are condemned by the
nature of their study to take a view one
way or the other, and to make- a choice
between the two alternatives. Since I think
that the first is in truth an impious view,
since I believe that it sets up the image of
man in place of the image of God, I would
like to urge the second upon you as your
choice: and to make some suggestions as to
the consequences that should follow.
Law -

A Depreciated Currency

Certainly it is a general feeling today;
not merely a misgiving among lawyers, that
Law as it is in our present time is not quite
the kind of thing that we want to regard
as Law; a feeling that the currency has
somehow been depreciated: It expresses
itself in various forms: complaints that
there is a great deal too much law, that it is
expressed in incomprehensible forms, that
the Parliamentary system for the production of statutes is highly defective, that the
ordinary citizen's rights are at the mercy
of an insensitive bureaucracy of civil servants. Every one of these complaints could
be made good to some extent, but I do not
pause to enlarge upon what is already
familiar, as familiar as the explanations
why these things must be so: the increasing
complexity of social organisation, the necessity of social and economic planning for a
society constituted as ours is, the sheer
pressure of our circumstances. Just as town
life has always needed more regulation by
authority than life in the country, so, We
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may say, the whole of England is today a
species of town, or, to be quite up to date,
a form of conurbanisation. And there is a
great deal of truth in this too. But in a
sense all of this, both complaint and explanation, is a description of symptoms and
is not an analysis of causes. I think that the
cause itself must be stated in very general
terms. It is that the kind of law that you
get in a country depends upon the kind of
theory of society that seems to be at work
in most people's minds, and the ruling
theory has undergone a very great change
in this country without any general recognition of the necessary consequences for what
we used to describe with some pride as the
"rule of law."
Do not let us therefore waste our energies by picking the wrong enemy. You
would think, from the way that many people
have talked, that the future of Law in this
country depended upon the case of Crichel
Down.2 Now I think that Crichel Down
was a diversionary skirmish indeed, but
certainly nothing like a major engagement.
It illustrated in rather dramatic form a
truth which hardly requires much drama
to illuminate it - that the remote exercise
of authority has a tendency to weaken the
sense of personal responsibility and that, in
consequence, individual rights and claims
are apt to get steam-rollered in the pursuit
of a general policy. Anyone who has held
high office in a large administrative organisation would confirm the difficulty of
avoiding this tendency in himself, if indeed
anyone does wholly avoid it. But these are
facts of human nature. When they have
'Public inquiry ordered by the Minister of Agriculture into the disposal of land at Crichel Down.
presented by the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries to Parliament by Command of Her Majesty,
Cmd. 9176 (June 1954).

been stated and allowed for, we are still
going to have government and bureaucracy
and administration, because we must, and
the "rule of law" is not vindicated in any
substantial sense by the discovery that from
time to time somebody in a large office has
not been as careful as he should have been
of individual rights. There is a dangerous
strain of escapism in all the agitation about
Crichel Down and the sins of bureaucracy.
It may turn out that there are much greater
sins at large among legislators and lawyers.
Watchdogs Against Encroachments?
Perhaps there is some instruction to be
got from asking what is the origin of the
belief so widespread among lawyers that
they are the watchdogs of the private citizen
against encroachments of the Executive. I
do not want to asperse its utility: better be
guardian for some purpose than none. But
I think that it must originate in a state of
society very different from that which is
established today. I take it to be derived by
historical descent from the seventeenth century and the Parliamentary struggle against
Charles I. Each of us is a little Pym. And
it is very true that the core of Parliamentary opposition to Stuart autocracy was a
legal opposition, an opposition of lawyers
based on law. It does not matter for the
present purpose that, according to some
recent historians, their law itself may have
been somewhat of the subjective order and
those ancient liberties of the subject which
the Parliamentary lawyers fought to vindicate were neither as ancient nor quite as
much liberties as they would have had the
public believe. At any rate, they were
heroes and their principles and beliefs did
in effect triumph with the Revolutionary
Settlement of 1688-89. The terms of that
Settlement were the work of Lord Somers,
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himself a lawyer. The popular interpretation of what it stood for was that the rights
and liberties of the individual citizen were
guaranteed from arbitrary interference at
the instance of Government or State, and
that the power of making or dispensing
with laws was safe from abuse, because it
was henceforth to be safely at home in King
and Parliament. There were even some
who thought - mistakenly - that the new
Constitution achieved a separation of the
legislative, executive and judicial powers.
Hence the shape of the Constitution of the
United States. But by the beginning of
the nineteenth century the experiences of
George III and George IV must have made
it clear that there was in fact no Separation
of Powers, and that the only means by
which the Crown could pursue a policy of
its own, should it desire to do so, was by
working through a dominant party in Parliament, not in spite of Parliament. By now
the question has ceased to be anything but
academic. The historic possibility of a clash
between Executive and Parliament has become an impossibility. There is nothing left
but the political party in control of the
House of Commons for the time being and
having at its disposal by virtue of the control an unrestricted legislative power. In the
exercise of that power it can override all
individual rights and liberties, personal or
proprietary, and it can make and dispense
with laws. No wonder that the old respect
for Law has begun to wear a little thin
when we can almost hear the clatter of the
printing presses that make and unmake it
as we watch.
If, however, we look to what lay at the
heart of the seventeenth-century struggle
between Crown and Parliament, it appears
that what was at issue Was not so much the
constitutional place of the Executive in the
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government of the country as a contest between two rival theories as to the nature of
society and of Government in relation to
society. There was nothing mean in the
conceptions of Charles and Laud and Strafford, each of whom was to die on the
scaffold for his form of belief - in many
respects their ideas were more elevated
than those of their Parliamentary opponents, less selfish and partisan. It is not a
mean thing to say and think that Government is a divine responsibility. But what
they claimed, and what was denied to them,
was that there was no Law that could stand
against the decision of the sovereign power
- the historic claim of every tyranny, however benevolent. "Kings, being absolute
rulers, have naturally full and free liberty
to dispose of all property whether in the
hands of clergy or of the laity." That is
Louis XIV speaking, a classic exponent of
autocratic theory. But does the current interpretation of the rights and duties of the
sovereign party in the House of Commons
lead to any very different conclusion? Yet
it was because that theory of Government
was decisively and, as we thought, finally
rejected, that it was possible to speak of
liberties of the subject, of the rule of law,
and to regard a detached and impartial
system of law as one of the cherished institutions of the country. It may have been
much less than that in the past, but the
question is whether it ever can be as much
as that in the future.
To Choose While the Choice Remains
Ultimately it becomes a question of faith,
and the essential thing is that, if we are to
choose, we should choose with our eyes
open and before things have gone so far
that there is no longer any choice, Before I
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end, I would like to mention one or two
considerations which I believe that history
has shown to be the recurrent issues that
must be faced. I am speaking only disconnectedly.
First, is Law made for men or men for
Law? If you are clear in your mind that it
is better for a man's moral nature that he
should do the right thing, of his own choice
and not under compulsion of others, you
will realise that every additional legal compulsion, however "right," reduces his field
of choice and impairs his true development.
And you will be chary of accepting the
claim that a thing is so "right" in itself that
men must be made to do it for its own sake.
For that is to give a greater value to the
abstraction than to the individual persons
involved in it. When I was young and read
in John Stuart Mill, I think, that it was a
positive injury to a man to deprive him of
the possibility of free choice and therefore
of moral action, I read it with a smile of
pleasure at a good debating point, while
wondering at the odd ideas that philosophers think up. Now I have come to believe
that it is a profoundly true observation, the
truth of which is painfully visible in some
aspects of contemporary society. Yet how
much of our legislation is ever purged by
this test? It has been well said that Law is
made for individual men and women and
not for things, whether it be things of property or those more beguiling general substantives which cloak the realities of human
beings. None of these things matter in the
last resort except as they serve to retard or
to forward the development of individual
persons.
Secondly, autocrats who regard themselves as interpreters of the divine will, and
democratic legislative chambers who regard
themselves as expressing the "general will"

or the "will of the people," are notoriously
careless of means in the light of ends and
of individual rights in the light of the general advantage. But an English lawyer is
trained to recognize that means may be as
important to the cause of justice as ends;
indeed that, in a sense, there can be no just
ends where just means have not been employed. It is an impiety to think that the
ends of human society are finite or that they
can be finally assessed in terms of humah
welfare. I think, therefore, that lawyers
have something of importance to say to
society, not something that is merely professional or technical, when they say that
men must not be vain enough to think that
just ends can be arrived at by any process
that is a denial of just means. But in saying
that, lawyers sometimes risk a misunderstanding. Society is not going to be saved
by importing the forms and rules of judicial
procedure into places where they do not
naturally belong. On the other hand, its
ways may be sweetened by a more lively
recollection that there are certain rules of
dealing between man and man, rules of fair
conduct and good breeding, which are just
as valid for the powers of Government as
they are for the court of law or ordinary
private life; and by the further recollection
that courts of law have a long and accumulating experience in working out and giving
shape to those rules.
The Relation of Institutions to the State
Lastly, Law must have a theory of the
relation of institutions to the State. Put it
this way: do they exist by sufferance, claiming what is merely a provisional and subordinate loyalty from their members, or is
their life and authority full and independent
within their own field? Certainly, the English tradition has rested on the belief that
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in society a man has many loyalties and
many masters, and that the richness of social
life depends on a just recognition of these
varied claims - school, church, university,
neighbourhood, industrial association, voluntary association of every kind and for
every purpose. Of course, this sort of social
federalism, if I may so call it, does not
make for the most efficient government. It
is not "streamlined" in the sense of those
Who think that they can safely apply a conception of mechanical quality to the life of
society. And so it is threatened from those
quarters in which a belief in efficiency is a
substitute for a belief in value. It is threatened too by that academic arbitrariness
which seeks to reduce the infinite complexities of human life to a series of logical
propositions. And yet, surely in this of all
things, the English tradition is soundly
based which sees in state power an agent
for harmonising and reconciling conflicting
loyalties, not a conqueror that supersedes
them. It ought not to be necessary to say
more when one speaks in a University,
since the independence of the university
function, even in the days of ample state
subvention, is so honourably established in
this country. But even that, apparently,
would be discarded at short notice if some
of the recent comments of the House of
Commons Public Accounts Committee
were to be attended to.
I do not believe that a theory of the independence of Institutions is anything different from a theory of personal liberty. It is a
pity that so much emphasis, following a
false lead from the United States, has been
thrown upon the merely personal aspect of
liberty. It is all very well to speak of the
right of free association. That is the personal side of it. But the rights of the association are equally important and equally
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entitled to respect. Unless they are respected
and allowed a free growth within their own
field, there is no real scope for that individual freedom which in truth is nothing in
itself unless it be that very thing by which
the human spirit drags itself towards its
own perfection.
I have come to the end, as I was afraid
that I should, with nothing said except generalities and platitudes, and nothing more
to my credit than that I have brought them
together in some order of arrangement. My
excuse is that what is a platitude to one
who is trained in Law can still be something of a mystery to someone who has not
that training. And today, I think, the history and traditions of English Law have not
much meaning for those in whose hands is
placed the effective control of this country.
The remedy for that is not that more people
should be taught law, but that lawyers
should take a larger part in the conduct of
public affairs. That itself will not come
about by learning Law only. Just because it
is, as I said at the beginning, one of the
great Humanities, its study perpetually
transcends its own limits and leads outward
into other fields of human thought. There
is a vast amount of hard and specialised
knowledge that has got to be mastered; but,
for all that, we look to the University Law
Schools to see to it that the study of English
law does not decline into that excessive
introspection which contemplates only its
own internal process. When you read Law
then, try to read it side by side with other
studies without which it is not fully understood - political philosophy, political economy, social and political history, perhaps,
most of all, general history. For it will be
brought home to you, I think, that while
the forms in which the human dilemma
(Continued on page 280)

